Online
radicalisation and the law
Islamic groups such as ISIL/ISIS
are presently the principle threat to the UK’s security[1]. We know that terrorist groups are
increasingly using information and communication technology to recruit and
radicalise those susceptible individuals in a purposeful and exacting manner[2] in order to grow their
support base. This seems like an obvious
communication strategy[3] for terrorist recruiters
and as the Internet has historically had few regulations[4], they have undertaken much
of this radicalisation under the radar of various law enforcement agencies[5]. This has been the focus of much justified
attention in the UK[6]
and the importance highlighted with the creation of agencies such as
Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (‘CITRU’); and the advent of the
Government’s strategy on counter terrorism: ‘CONTEST’[7]; pursuant to, the relevant
statutory provisions of Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (‘CTSA 2015’).
Research indicates that
initial contact is often made with the specifically targeted individuals via
the Internet and in particular, via social media websites[8]. Thereafter the indirect contact can be
solidified by deeper and intense (even direct) contact[9].
Furthermore, research shows
that individuals often targeted and/or inclined to be drawn into the
radicalisation machine are vulnerable and young[10], “socially deprived,
marginalised males” who tend to spend more time online[11]. The sociological questions
are naturally: are these individuals drawn to these available social media
pages because they feel ostracised due to of failures within the host countries
or; are they ostracised because they seek interests and values that are not
within mainstream society? Would the
massive inequalities in wealth[12] have ensued had there
been a “peace on terror” instead of a “war on terror”? Socio-economic divisions
are notably marked during this period, and the UN pledged to overcome these
divisions within their ‘Agenda for Peace’[13]. This Agenda distinguishes between terrorism and
democracy; outlining terrorism as the antithesis of social inclusion, actively
working against social acceptance within a democracy.
In the UK, the Home Office
does not believe a susceptible individual[14] can be pinpointed
however, note that certain background factors may contribute to an individual’s
vulnerability[15]. When this is coupled with the frequency with
which young persons’ are online[16], the Home Office are able
to draw inferences and react accordingly by providing necessary guidance for
local authorities[17] on both recognising and
tackling this growing concern[18]. In addition to the regulatory framework[19], the requirements are
further fulfilled by the presence of supportive organisations armed with
specialist techniques namely Channel’[20] and ’Families Against
Stress and Trauma’ (‘FAST’)[21].
Interactivity within the cyber
realm is increasing, playing games online with people worldwide, educating
children online, and instant communication[22] is an intrinsic part of
this enablement. These interactive
systems can ‘learn’ behavioural patterns of users and be manipulated
accordingly[23]. It was only a matter of time before the
criminal domain optimised this development to grow their following and
desensitise potential recruits to violent extremism. These interactions are readily available on a
variety of platforms accessible to all[24].
The advantages of social media
sites are that the posts can be quickly distributed, removed and re-posted as
necessary[25];
with instantaneous alerts available on all viewing devices.
Evidence of increased
interactivity lends to the training of recruits; CONTEST reported that some
returning radicalised Britons[26] were “likely to have
received combat…and other…related training”[27] in situ however we are increasingly aware of training being disseminated
online via social media[28] accounts[29]. Interactive processes are able to generate
messages[30]
at an alarming rate, recruiters are reported to bombard recruits with some
“200,000 tweets a day”[31] effectively brainwashing
“young, impressionable”[32] recruits with
over-saturation of a message.
The disadvantages of social
media sites are that the IP address, for the most part, can be located and the
perpetrator apprehended however, there is evidence suggesting that ISIL is
becoming adept at avoiding this pitfall[33]. Assisting this phenomenon, ‘Cloud’ computing
increasingly allows for both secretive storage and dissemination of contentious
material; and care should be taken here.
The main processes used by
ISIL revolve around the 4 essential themes[34]. All these themes are supported by powerful,
persuasive images[35] and use of language[36] and literature[37] on the social media
websites. Processes potentially rely
heavily on the individual’s own ability to ‘self-radicalise’[38] but these proven
techniques act as a funnel. Effectively,
hitting a wide audience initially, getting individuals ‘hooked’, then taking
those devoted individuals deeper into secretive communication with a view to
encouraging travel to regions[39] and defection from
Western values[40]. Western values that are not necessarily held
by these individuals; research indicates that these opposing beliefs are held
prior to interaction online, and are simply “reinforced”[41] by recruiters.
In the years following 9/11 we
witnessed regimes being terminated by force; including detentions without trial
and torture[42]
yet despite these deterrents, the recruitment of terrorists steadily continues.
And technological processes
importantly, are such that the terrorist organisations use ‘PGP’[43] settings to achieve their
goal of reaching individuals with communications covertly; evading interception
by international law enforcement agencies.
Data is encrypted and capable of decryption with PGP software[44].
Processes are becoming
increasingly interrupted by law enforcement agencies in the UK however these
disruptions[45]
can be overcome by highly motivated recruiters[46]. We know that initial contact is openly
available and has been deemed “relatively easy”[47] to do. Social media campaigns are utilised to
effectively repost “closed forum” content to a wider group[48].
When examining counter
terrorist strategies effectively interrupting these terrorist processes we know
that “since February 2010 over 95,000 pieces of terrorist content have been
removed from the Internet”[49] in the UK. An achievement by organisations such as
CITRU, working with “key social media outlets”[50] in a bid to eradicate the
content deemed in breach of statutory provisions[51].
In conclusion, wider concerns
surrounding the interception of personal communication technology by government
agencies[52],
has justly prompted the UK to insert a regulated framework[53] to prevent any
abuses. We understand that “global
consensus”[54]
is required however, political beliefs are intrinsically subjective thus law
enforcement is internationally variable on this topic allowing gaps to
evolve. We recognise that it is
essential for law enforcement agencies to work ceaselessly to remove terrorist
material[55]
and overcome the legislative barriers when locating content on foreign
servers. It is critical to pre-empt the
attractive trends for terrorist recruiters[56] and one argument is; if
we are not able to remain one step ahead of terrorist’s technological tactics,
simply adopt the same strategies for accomplishing counter terrorist goals[57].
As previously outlined, we all
are required to act responsibly online and in the cyber realm. Should you require legal assistance in this
area, please contact me directly.
Please note this article was drafted
prior to the recent attack in London and our thoughts are with all those
affected.
Next
time: looking at arming of PSCs/PMCs and legal
implications. Any issues that you may want
covered, please contact.
[1]
CONTEST: the UK’s strategy for countering terrorism. (2015). Annual
Report for 2014. Retrieved: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/contest
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Freiburger, T., & Crane, J.S. (2008). A Systematic Examination of Terrorist
Use of the Internet. International Journal of Cyber Criminology,
Volume 2 (Issue 1), p 310.
[4]
CONTEST: the UK’s strategy for countering terrorism. (2011). Report
for July 2011. Retrieved: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/contest
[5] Op. cit. n. 3.
[6]
Op. cit. n. 1.
[7]
General outline of CONTEST: the UK’s strategy for countering terrorism.
(2016). Retrieved: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/contest
[8]
Families Against Stress and Trauma (‘FAST’).
(2016). Various. Retrieved: http://www.familiesmatter.org.uk/should-i-worry/extremism-online/
[9]
FAST. (2016) ISIS
online. Retrieved: http://www.familiesmatter.org.uk/should-i-worry/extremism-online/
[10]
Paul Gill & John Horgan (2013) Who Were the Volunteers? The Shifting
Sociological and Operational Profile of 1240 Provisional Irish Republican Army
Members, Terrorism and Political Violence, 25:3, 435-456, DOI:
10.1080/09546553.2012.664587 cited in S. Macdonald and D. Mair, “Terrorism
online: a new strategic environment,” chapter 1 of L. Jarvis, S. Macdonald and
T. M. Chen (eds) Terrorism Online:
Politics, Law and Technology (2015; Oxon: Routledge), p.16.
[11] Freiburger, T., & Crane, J.S. (2008). A Systematic Examination of Terrorist
Use of the Internet. International Journal of Cyber Criminology,
Volume 2 (Issue 1), at p 313.
[12]
P. Rogers, “Peace Studies,” chapter 5 of A. Collins (ed) Contemporary Security Studies (2007; Oxford: Collins), p.80.
[13] United
Nations: Security-General. (1992). The
Agenda for Peace. (A/47/277). Retrieved: http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm
[14]
Home Office.
(2015). Keeping Children Safe in
Education: statutory guidance for schools and colleges. Retrieved: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/447595/KCSIE_July_2015.pdf
[15] Ibid.
[16]
S. Macdonald and D. Mair, “Terrorism online: a new strategic environment,”
chapter 1 of L. Jarvis, S. Macdonald and T. M. Chen (eds) Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and Technology (2015; Oxon:
Routledge), p.16.
[17]
Section 29 Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015.
[18] The
PREVENT strategy as outlined within the UK’s Strategy for countering Terrorism
see: Op. cit. n. 4.
[19]
Sections 36 to 38 Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015.
[20]
As part of the PREVENT strategy within CONTEST
reporting cited in: Home Office. (2015).
How Social Media is used to encourage
travel to Syria and Iraq: Briefing Note for Schools. Retrieved: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/447595/KCSIE_July_2015.pdf
[21] Ibid.
[22]
CONTEST: the UK’s strategy for countering terrorism. (2011). Report
for July 2011. Retrieved: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/contest
[23] This has been found particularly useful for
legitimate marketing campaigns as the organisations can utilise dialogic media
technology to strategically build rapport with their targeted audience see:
WiKipedia (2016). Interactive media. Retrieved:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interactive_media
[24] Freiburger, T., & Crane, J.S. (2008). A Systematic Examination of Terrorist
Use of the Internet. International Journal of Cyber Criminology,
Volume 2 (Issue 1), p 313.
[25] Op.
cit. n. 22.
[26]
CONTEST: the UK’s strategy for countering terrorism. (2015). Annual
Report for 2014. Retrieved: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/contest
[27]
Ibid.
[28]
Op. cit. n. 24 at p. 311.
[29] For example; the videos available on YouTube
and online bomb making guides cited: Op. cit. n. 24 at p. 315.
[30]
By way of social media messaging in particular.
[31]
As outlined when discussing the Counter Terrorism Project cited on: Families
Against Stress and Trauma (‘FAST’).
(2016). Various. Retrieved: http://www.familiesmatter.org.uk/should-i-worry/extremism-online/
[32]
Ibid.
[33]
ISIL are developing software to evade IP address being located cited: United
Nations Security Council. (2015). Implementation of Security Council
Resolution 2178 (2014) by States affected by foreign terrorist fighters. (S/2015/683).
Retrieved: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/N1527297_EN.pdf
34 Four
themes are outlined: The image of
success portrayed by the organisation; status and belonging (focusing on the
individual’s duty to engage in travel); the personal duty of that individual to
be part of the ‘caliphate’ and finally the expectation that the individual
needs to defend the Sunni Muslims against the threat of the West see: Home Office. (2015). How
Social Media is used to encourage travel to Syria and Iraq: Briefing Note for
Schools. Retrieved: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/447595/KCSIE_July_2015.pdf.
[35]
Instagram used for images of fighters and a happy quality of life in Syria see Home
Office Report: Ibid.
[36] The Cyberterrorism Project. (2015). Online
Terrorist Magazines: Preliminary Findings November 2015. Retrieved: http://www.cyberterrorism-project.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CTP-2015-Report-Nov-03.pdf
[37]
Often using “prayers, religious aphorisms and content from the Quran” see page
24 of: The Brookings Project on U.S
Relations with the Islamic World: J.M Berger and Jonathan Morgan. (2015). The
Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on
Twitter (Analysis Paper No.20, March 2015).
Massachusetts: Brookings.
[38]
S. Macdonald and D. Mair, “Terrorism online: a new strategic environment,”
chapter 1 of L. Jarvis, S. Macdonald and T. M. Chen (eds) Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and Technology (2015; Oxon:
Routledge), p.17.
[39]
Explanation of private messaging as per the process see: Op. cit. n 35.
[40] Freiburger, T., & Crane, J.S. (2008). A Systematic Examination of Terrorist
Use of the Internet. International Journal of Cyber Criminology,
Volume 2 (Issue 1), p 314.
[41]
P. Gill and E. Corner, “Lone actor terrorist use of Internet and behavioural
correlates,” chapter 2 of L. Jarvis, S. Macdonald and T. M. Chen (eds) Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and
Technology (2015; Oxon: Routledge), p.40.
[42]
P. Rogers, “Peace Studies,” chapter 5 of A. Collins (ed) Contemporary Security Studies (2007; Oxford: Collins), p.80.
[43]
‘Pretty Good Privacy’ (PGP) cited: WiKipedia.
(2016) Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP). Retrieved: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy
[44]
PGP defined as per: Ibid.
[45]
CONTEST: the UK’s strategy for countering terrorism. (2015). Annual
Report for 2014. Retrieved: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/contest
[46]
ISIL has scuppered attempts at this see: United Nations Security Council. (2015). Implementation
of Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) by States affected by foreign
terrorist fighters. (S/2015/683).
Retrieved: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/N1527297_EN.pdf
[47]
Ibid.
[48]
Op. cit. n. 46.
[49] Home
Office. (2015). How Social Media is used to encourage travel to Syria and Iraq:
Briefing Note for Schools. Retrieved:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/447595/KCSIE_July_2015.pdf
[50]
Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit. (2015). The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CITRU). Retrieved: https://wiki.openrightsgroup.org/wiki/Counter_Terrorism_Internet_Referral_Unit
[51]
Sections 1 & 2 Terrorism Act 2006.
[52]
Op. cit. n. 46.
[53]
See Privacy and Civil Liberties Board
to oversee and review Terrorism Legislation within Section 46 Counter
Terrorism and Security Act 2015.
[54] Op.
cit. n. 46.
[55]
Sections 1 and 2 of Terrorism Act 2006.
[56] Op.
cit. n. 46.
[57] Freiburger, T., & Crane, J.S. (2008). A Systematic Examination of Terrorist
Use of the Internet. International Journal of Cyber Criminology,
Volume 2 (Issue 1), p 316.
